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Depressive realism consists of the lower personal control over uncontrollable 
events perceived by depressed as compared to nondepressed individuals. In this 
article, we propose that the realism of depressed individuals is caused not by an 
increased accuracy in perception, but by their more comprehensive exposure to 
the actual environmental contingencies, which in turn is due to their more pas-
sive pattern of responding. To test this hypothesis, dysphoric and nondysphoric 
participants were exposed to an uncontrollable task and both their probability 
of responding and their judgment of control were assessed. As was expected, 
higher levels of depression correlated negatively with probability of responding 
and with the illusion of control. Implications for a therapy of depression are 
discussed.
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Under certain conditions, people tend to overestimate the relationship 
between their actions and reinforcers, even if these events occur noncontin-
gently. Langer (1975) called this phenomenon the illusion of control, because 
it consists of people believing that they have personal control over uncon-
trollable events. the idea that sometimes people perceive contingencies in 
a nonrealistic way had been proposed long ago (e.g., Ward & Jenkins, 1965), 
and since Langer’s seminal article on the illusion of control, many research-
ers have replicated this effect under very different conditions (e.g., Alloy 
& Abramson, 1979; Matute, Vadillo, Vegas, & Blanco, 2007; Rudski, Lisch-
ner, & Albert, 1999). A very influential article was Alloy and Abramson’s; 
they found that college students who were mildly depressed tended to show 
less illusion of control than nondysphoric students. this new effect was 
called depressive realism and it is of much theoretical and practical impor-
tance: traditional theories of depression had often associated perceptual 
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distortions with depressed personality (Beck, 1967), but the finding that 
depressed individuals are more realistic in their detection of noncontin-
gency contradicts this view.
In addition to depression, studies in the area of contingency judgments 
have detected many other variables that modulate the illusion of control. 
Some interesting examples are the percentage of reinforcement, also called 
outcome density (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Matute, 1995; Rudski et al., 1999), 
skill-related factors (thompson, Armstrong, & thomas, 1998), valence of 
outcomes (Aeschleman, Rosen, & Williams, 2002; Alloy & Abramson, 1979), 
length of the intertrial intervals (Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007; Msetfi, 
Murphy, Simpson, & kornbrot, 2005), number of trials (Shanks & Dickinson, 
1987), delay of reinforcement (Rudski, 2000), and probability of responding 
(Matute, 1996). the present research is concerned with this latter factor. 
In Matute’s (1996) experiment, instructions given to participants made 
them more or less likely to respond in order to produce the outcome, which 
was response independent. According to Matute (1996), in order to be able 
to detect that an outcome occurs with the same probability regardless of 
whether participants respond or not, participants must respond with a 
probability of 0.5 or close to it. that is, only by responding in 50% of the 
trials can participants be exposed to (and detect) what happens both when 
they respond and when they do not respond. By contrast, as the probability 
of responding approaches 1, it becomes more difficult to notice that the 
events could have occurred with the same probability in the absence of 
responding. Matute’s (1996) results confirmed this prediction: the variations 
in the probability of responding that were induced through instructions in 
a regular student sample positively correlated with the illusion of control. 
Although she did not study differences between depressed and nondepressed 
participants, a straightforward prediction of this approach is that the 
passivity and low probability of responding that is usually associated with 
depression (Lewinsohn, Sullivan, & Grosscup, 1980) could be responsible for 
the accuracy of depressed individuals in detecting the absence of control 
(see also e. Skinner, 1985). the present research provides a direct test for 
this hypothesis.
Let us illustrate this mechanism with an example. Imagine an athlete 
who always performs his or her personal “magical ritual of victory” the 
night before taking part in a competition. Like almost anyone, this athlete 
sometimes obtains a good result and sometimes a bad result. obviously, 
no connection between performing the ritual and winning or losing the 
competition exists. However, if the ritual is performed at every opportunity, 
it is impossible to know whether the ritual has any effect, because the 
athlete will lack a critical piece of information: the probability with which 
the reinforcer would have occurred if the ritual had not been performed. 
If the athlete wins, for example, 80% of the time, and he or she always 
performs the ritual the night before the competition (so the probability 
of responding is 1), then the ritual will show an apparent strong effect 
on the athlete’s achievement. But, if the athlete had never performed the 
ritual, or at least had reduced its execution to, say, 50% of the trials, he or 
she would have realized that he or she still could win 80% of the time. It 
would be easy to conclude in that case that the good results obtained are 
not an effect of the magical influences of the ritual. It seems clear, thus, 
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that perceived contingency is affected by the probability of responding. 
Indeed, most experiments showing that participants are able to accurately 
detect an absence of contingency have explicitly instructed the participants 
to respond in about 50% of the trials (see, e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; 
Wasserman, 1990). 
In essence, what we are suggesting is not too different from B.F. 
Skinner’s (1948) depiction, in his classic experiment on superstition in 
the pigeon, of adventitiously reinforced behavior. Indeed, in a context in 
which a noncontingent reinforcer is occurring at a high rate, the more the 
animal (or human) responds, the greater the chances that responses and 
reinforcers will coincide. Skinner’s experiments with pigeons were strongly 
criticized by research showing that his results could be better explained as 
Pavlovian conditioning than as superstitious instrumental behavior (e.g., 
Staddon & Simmelhag, 1971). this problem, however, does not invalidate the 
idea that the more active a person is, the greater the chances that his or her 
behavior will be reinforced in situations in which the reinforcer is occurring 
adventitiously. What we suggest is simply that the illusion of control is 
strongly based on these response–reinforcer coincidences. And, by the same 
reasoning, it follows that depressive individuals, who are generally less 
active, should be less prone to experiencing adventitious reinforcers and thus 
less vulnerable to the illusion of control. the main purpose of the present 
research was, therefore, to test the hypothesis that depressive realism is due, 
at least in part, to the low response rate of depressed participants. Although 
the relationship between activity and depression in response-contingent 
situations is well known (Lewinsohn, 1974; Lewinsohn et al., 1980), what we 
aim to test here goes beyond this point: the lower activity not only reduces 
the chances to obtain response-contingent reinforcers but also reduces the 
chances that noncontingent reinforcers will coincide with the participant’s 
responses. thus, lower activity reduces the chances that the participant can 
develop an illusion of control.
An additional purpose of this experiment was to test for the generality of 
the effect. Given that most, if not all, studies on the depressive realism effect 
have been conducted with college students (and particularly with psychology 
students), one may wonder whether the effect is a laboratory artifact that is 
restricted to those very artificial and controlled situations. For this reason, 
we decided to use the Internet as our research arena, to test for depressive 
realism in a less restricted environment. 
overview of the experiment
Participants first completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & erbaugh, 1961) and were classified as either 
dysphoric or nondysphoric. then, both groups of participants were asked 
to produce an outcome on the computer screen by pressing the space 
bar in a task where the outcomes were actually programmed to occur 
independently of their behavior. At the end of the experiment we asked 
participants to rate their degree of perceived control over the outcome. If 
our hypothesis is correct, we should observe both a lower probability of 
responding and a lower illusion of control in dysphoric, as compared to 
nondysphoric, individuals. 
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Method
Participants and Apparatus
Sixty-six participants took part in the experiment via the Internet. All 
were anonymous volunteers who visited our virtual laboratory (www.labpsico 
.com) and decided to take part in the experiment. to increase participation 
in the experiment, and following ethical standards for human research over 
the Internet (Frankel & Siang, 1999), we did not ask participants to provide 
any personal data, nor did we use cookies or software to obtain involuntary 
personal information from them. Nevertheless, and although the use of 
an Internet-based methodology is not yet very common in mental health 
research, the advantages and disadvantages of Web-delivered experiments 
have been well studied and documented. Admittedly, it is difficult to ensure 
that all constraints are met as in a traditional laboratory, but the potential 
problems are well known and several solutions have been worked out (see, 
e.g., Reips, 2002). It is hard to ensure, for instance, that no participants took 
the experiment more than once. However, they should be too bored to do so. 
even so, if this were to ever happen, the main consequence would be that it 
would be impossible to replicate the standard laboratory result, and this is 
very easily detected. For this reason, a replication of the basic laboratory result 
is the first control that we request; only after we are sure that our experiment 
replicates the basic laboratory effect (in the present case, the depressive 
realism effect) will we trust any other additional results that we may get 
from the Internet sample. Using this general approach, very similar results 
are generally being reported when the same experiment is reproduced in the 
laboratory and through the Internet (see, e.g., Birnbaum, 2000; Buchanan, & 
Smith, 1999; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; kraut, olson, Banaji, 
Bruckman, Cohen, & Couper, 2004; Matute, Vadillo, Vegas, & Blanco, 2007; 
Steyvers, tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003; Vadillo, Bárcena, & Matute, 
2006; Vadillo & Matute, 2007). therefore, and as a means of controlling for 
possibly noisy data in this experiment, we will check that the results replicate 
the basic depressive realism effect before we move on to study the effect of 
our target variable, the probability of responding.
Participants were classified as either dysphoric or nondysphoric, as a 
function of their direct BDI scores. those with a direct score of 9 or above 
were included in the dysphoric group, whereas participants who scored below 
9 were assigned to the nondysphoric group. this cutoff point was the same 
already used in many other studies about depressive realism (e.g., Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979; Msetfi et al., 2005) and implies not a clinical categorization 
but, rather, a common way to identify mildly depressed individuals among a 
typical population of college students (this is the reason why we prefer to use 
the term dysphoric instead of depressed). this resulted in the classification of 
41 participants as nondysphoric and 25 as dysphoric. Mean BDI scores were 
3.68 (MSE = 0.36) in the nondysphoric group and 17.88 (MSE = 1.26) in the 
dysphoric group.
Procedure
Before the experiment began, participants completed the BDI (Spanish 
adaptation by Conde, esteban, & Useros, 1976), which is often used in the 
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depressive realism literature as a depression measure (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 
1979). Its purpose in this type of experiment is not to detect clinically 
depressed individuals but to provide a simple and rapid identification of mild 
depression or dysphoria in a normal population. After completion, a message 
told participants that scores and feedback would be presented at the end the 
experiment. this was done in this way so that the feedback could not affect 
performance during the experiment.
the experimental task was an adaptation of the one used by Matute (1996), 
except that, in order to facilitate its execution over the Internet, the partici-
pants were requested to produce visual images (blue flashes) on the computer 
screen rather than to escape from noise. this version had already been suc-
cessfully tested for the illusion-of-control effect, both in our laboratory and 
through the Internet, with very similar patterns of results in both cases (see 
Matute, Vadillo, & Bárcena, 2007; Matute, Vadillo, Vegas, & Blanco, 2007; a 
demonstration of this program, including source code, can be downloaded 
from our Web site, http://www.labpsico .com). A translation from Spanish of 
the instructions used in this experiment reads as follows:
In this experiment you will see some blue flashes on your monitor 
from time to time. When they appear, they have a fixed duration 
of 1 s. Your task will be to make them appear. that is, YoU WILL 
Be tRYING to keeP tHe MoNItoR SCReeN BLUe as much of the 
time as possible. In order to do so, you will have to do something 
very rapidly with the space bar each time that a flash finishes. If 
you do it RIGHt, the flash will show up again very rapidly. If you 
do it WRoNG, the flash will stay off for 5 s. 
A total of 50 flashes were presented, and all of them had a fixed duration 
of 1 s. there was no actual contingency between pressing the space bar and the 
occurrence of the flashes, which were presented on a preprogrammed schedule 
with short (1-s) and long (5-s) intervals between flashes. According to the 
instructions, the participants’ goal was to make the flash show up again very 
rapidly every time it turned off. thus, the 1-s intervals were planned to work 
as (noncontingent) positive reinforcement, whereas the 5-s intervals should 
work as nonreinforced trials. Regardless of whether the participant responded, 
the task was programmed in such a way that 75% of the intervals between 
the flashes lasted 1 s and the other 25% lasted 5 s. this high percentage of 
reinforcement, with prevalence of short intervals, should favor the development 
of the illusion of control, as it is well known that a higher percentage of 
reinforcers produces stronger illusions (Allan, Siegel, & Hannah, 2007; Alloy 
& Abramson, 1979; Matute, 1995). the important point, however, is that, 
according to our hypothesis, coincidences between responses and reinforcers 
should be more frequent in nondysphoric than in dysphoric people—because 
the probability of responding would be higher in nondysphoric participants. 
this, in turn, should produce the greater accuracy of dysphoric participants 
in detecting the null contingency. Responses on the space bar were collected 
to test whether dysphoric participants did actually have a lower probability of 
responding, which we defined as the number of trials in which there was at 
least one response divided by the total number of trials.
After the 50 scheduled flashes, the judgments of control were assessed 
via the following question, which was presented on the middle of the screen: 
To what extent do you think you have controlled the onset of the flashes? the 
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answers were given by clicking on scale of 0 to 100 (0 = I did not control it, 
100 = I controlled it). Given that the present experiment resembled a zero-
control condition in which the outcomes are programmed to occur, regardless 
of whether the participant responds or not, a judgment of control would 
be more realistic the closer it is to zero. Finally, once the participants had 
provided their causal rating, they were shown their BDI score, together with 
a brief explanation of the purpose of the experiment and a reminder that the 
questionnaire was used for research purposes only and that those interested 




























































Figure 1. Mean judgments of control (upper panel) and mean probability of responding 
(lower panel) for dysphoric and nondysphoric participants. Error bars show the standard 
error of the mean.
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Results 
the results of this experiment show that, as expected, dysphoric 
participants were more passive and produced lower judgments of control 
about noncontingent reinforcers than nondysphoric participants. 
the upper panel of Figure 1 shows the mean judgments of control for 
both dysphoric and nondysphoric participants. A one-way ANoVA detected a 
significant effect of mood on judgments, F(1, 64) = 19.03, p < .001, with dysphoric 
participants being more realistic than nondysphoric ones. Additionally, we 
found a negative correlation between BDI scores and judgments of control, 
r = –.32, p < .001. these converging results indicate that we successfully 
replicated the depressive realism effect with an Internet sample.
In addition, the following analyses show that, as we anticipated, this 
depressive realism effect was mirrored by a differential level of responding 
in dysphoric and nondysphoric participants. the lower panel from Figure 1 
shows the mean probability of responding in both groups. A one-way ANoVA 
showed a significant effect of mood on the probability of responding, F(1, 64) 
= 7.47, p < .01: Dysphoric participants showed a lower activity level (implying 
more passivity) than nondysphoric participants. In addition, correlational 
analyses showed a significant negative correlation between BDI score and 
probability of responding, r = –.306, p < .01 (i.e., the greater the BDI score, 
the lower the probability of responding), and, more interesting, a significant 
positive correlation between probability of responding and judgment of 
control, r = .32, p < .01 (i. e., the lower the probability of responding, the lower 
the judgment of control). 
Discussion
Since Alloy and Abramson’s seminal work in 1979, depressive realism 
has been a fertile research area and has provided interesting discussions 
among scientists (e.g., Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991; Allan et al., 2007; Alloy 
& Clements, 1992; Haaga & Beck, 1995; Matute, 1996; Msetfi et al., 2005). We 
have proposed that differential probability of responding, as a function of 
mood, plays a relevant role in depressive realism: In contrast to nondysphoric 
individuals, who tend to respond as much as they can to obtain a desired 
outcome, depressive individuals are more passive, and this provides them 
with more comprehensive exposure to what happens both when they respond 
as well as when they do not respond. theirs is certainly a maladaptive 
behavior when one is trying to maximize reinforcement, but it happens to 
be the best possible strategy when one is trying to maximize accuracy in the 
detection of contingencies (see Matute, Vadillo, Blanco, & Musca, 2007, for 
further theoretical elaboration and computer simulations on this point). 
the results of this experiment supported our hypothesis: First, partici-
pants who scored higher on the BDI showed less illusion of control than the 
others, therefore replicating Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) basic depressive re-
alism effect. Moreover, recall that the participants were anonymous Internet 
users, which is indicative of the robustness of this effect. Second, the dys-
phoric participants were more passive, and tended to emit no responses in 
more trials than nondysphoric participants did. Finally, we have shown that 
participants with higher probability of responding were more vulnerable to the 
illusion of control than participants with a lower probability of responding.
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It is noteworthy that Matute (1996) obtained the reduction in the illusion 
of control by manipulating just the instructions given to participants, which 
encouraged two different levels of probability of responding. the reduction in 
the illusion of control that we obtained in the present experiment was induced 
by mood, not instructions, but the underlying mechanism is presumably the 
same: probability of responding. thus, a clear prediction of our theory is 
that any manipulation that alters the probability of responding, be it a mood 
state, instructions, fatigue, drugs, exercise, or any other one, should be able to 
influence the actual exposure to environmental contingencies and, thereby, 
the subjective perception of control. In this sense, depression is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for depressive realism: A nondepressed person can 
show a realistic perception of uncontrollability if instructed to reduce his 
or her rate of responding (Matute, 1996), but, most importantly, our current 
results suggest that a depressed person could probably develop illusions of 
control if asked to increase his or her level of responding. 
As noted by Plaud and eifert (1998), given the high prevalence rates and 
human and financial costs associated with depression, it is not surprising 
that depression is a widely studied disorder and that so many different, and 
sometimes contradictory, behavioral and cognitive models of depression 
have been proposed (e.g., Beck, 1967; Lewinsohn, 1974; Rehm, 1977; Seligman, 
1975). Lewinsohn, in one of the most widely cited studies of depression, 
argued that depression is due to a lack of reinforcers, whereas Seligman 
argued that it is not the lack of reinforcers but the lack of control over them 
that causes depression. the present results, together with those of Alloy and 
Abramson (1979) and many other experiments showing illusions of control 
and depressive realism effects, show that the lack of control over reinforcers 
is not even detected by human participants unless they are already depressed 
(see Matute, 1994, and Schwartz, 1981, for further elaboration on this point).
traditional theories of the illusion of control and depressive realism 
have focused on personality and internal variables as explanations for these 
effects (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Haaga & Beck, 1995). the theory we 
are proposing is perfectly compatible with these views, but it is framed in a 
more basic level of analysis. While agreeing that sadness and negativity do 
affect the perception of contingency, we suggest that the way they do it (or at 
least one of the ways) is by reducing the probability of responding. In other 
words, the reduction in the illusion of control that depressive individuals 
show is actually a secondary effect of the lower probability of responding 
that is associated with depressive mood. of course, we cannot be sure about 
the direction of causality; it could well be that it is passivity that comes first, 
and it produces depression through a better exposure of the reinforcer’s 
occurrences in the absence of responding (and, thus, a greater perception 
of the absence of control). In either case, increasing levels of activity has 
important implications for therapy, which we will next discuss.
Beck’s (1967) characterization of depressive thinking as negative and 
pessimistic became the most extended framework for therapists, most of whom 
try to eradicate irrational bias in depressive thinking (see also ellis, 1962). 
However, findings about depressive realism may change this generalized view. 
For example, they clearly show that certain biases and illusions are part of a 
healthy, nondepressed, and well-adapted mind, and that the lack of these biases, 
even though it leads to realism and objectivity, is associated with depression 
and maladaptation (e.g., Alloy & Clements, 1992; Forgas, 1998; taylor & Brown, 
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1988). these reports suggest that even in situations that are uncontrollable 
(e.g., an incurable illness), therapists should sometimes promote some degree 
of illusion—which is healthy and protects one from external stressors—instead 
of pursuing an objective, unbiased way of thinking. 
In addition, if, as we have shown, probability of responding plays an im-
portant role in the illusion of control, then an important component of de-
pression therapy should be to increase the activity level of depressed people. 
It is often easier to increase a patient’s activity level than to increase his or 
her positive and optimistic cognitions. Increasing the individual’s probabil-
ity of acting even before he or she is able to see any relationship between 
behavior and desired outcomes should eventually increase the number of co-
incidences between responses and desired outcomes. Indeed, increasing the 
activity levels of depressed patients has long been recommended by behavior 
analytic theories on the grounds that the more a patient responds, the great-
er the opportunities to obtain response-contingent reinforcers (Lewinsohn, 
1974; Lewinsohn et al., 1980). What our results show is that this approach is 
beneficial not only in controllable situations but, most importantly, in uncon-
trollable situations as well (see B. F. Skinner, 1948). the illusion of control that 
will probably result from this strategy is quite incompatible with depression 
and helplessness (see also Matute, 1994, 1996). 
of course, our suggestion is not without its risks. Sometimes, increasing 
the illusion of control can be dangerous. As an example, consider the case 
of individuals who prefer to believe in magical curative rituals than in 
scientific medicine in order to cure their diseases. However, increasing the 
probability of responding should be a very effective strategy when applied 
by rigorous and experienced psychologists. Indeed, it is a very adaptive 
strategy, not only as a means to increase illusions, but also as the most 
effective possible way to maximize reinforcers in controllable situations. As 
discussed above, it is generally much better to be active than to be passive 
when trying to maximize reinforcers.
Admittedly, our laboratory experiments, as most experiments in this area, 
were conducted with dysphoric participants, rather than clinically depressed 
individuals. even so, these experiments suggest that to increase illusions and 
reduce depression, one of the variables that we can most easily manipulate is the 
patient’s tendency to act. this is congruent with many behavior therapies that try 
to increase the activity levels of depressed patients. our experiments show that 
this strategy is effective not only because by being active one can obtain more 
reinforcers in controllable situations, but also because even if the situation is 
uncontrollable, one can have the optimistic illusion of personal control. the next 
step should clearly be to conduct the studies with clinically depressed patients. 
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